

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X (w/o att)		
3	EXDIR		X "		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X (w/o att)		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	C/SECOM				
20	ES	X (w/att)			
21			X (w/o att)		
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

3637 (10-81)

31 July 1984

Date

25X1


SECRET
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Executive Registry
84- 5060/1

31 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: Leak Study

Will you develop a Table of Organization and a phased program for implementing the Recommendations in the Executive Summary of the SECOM Leak Study. Statistics show CIA material to have been leaked most frequently. How can this be balanced to show where most of the leaks occurred? What is circulation of pubs which carried leaks -- NID, DIA, State daily, etc.? Does high incidence of leaks of CIA and NSA material come from there being most prolific reporting? To what extent?


William J. Casey

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5-107
XF 1-204A

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30 July 1984

FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Chairman, SECOM
SUBJECT: Leak Study

Attached, per the request of [REDACTED]
is a draft of the leak study conducted under
the auspices of SECOM's Unauthorized
Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS).
The UDIS members, primarily those from DoD
agencies, have taken exception to certain
findings about the manner in which leak
investigations are conducted. They wish
the study and the executive summary to be
confined essentially to data on the numbers,
types and frequency of leaks. The attached
executive summary and recommendations,
therefore, are still being negotiated by
UDIS Chairman, [REDACTED] with the members.

[REDACTED]

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INFORMATION

DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
LEAK STUDY REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose:

The DCI's Security Committee commissioned a review of leak investigation records from fiscal years 1979 through 1983 of all Intelligence Community agencies in order to develop greater insight into the leak problem and to develop appropriate recommendations for combatting leaks. This review was restricted to cases of first time leaks of classified intelligence information.

Findings:

1. Based on the available evidence, there has been a significant increase in the number of leaks occurring each year along with an increase in the number of media outlets and journalists who publish leaks. Further, the classified intelligence information being leaked is more current.

-The frequency of publication of intelligence leaks has doubled between FY 1979 - FY 1983.

-All media except wire services reflect this doubling.

-A significant increase in the number of separate magazines publishing leaks occurred in FY 1983.

-The median lag between the publication of intelligence information in the government and its subsequent appearance in the open media was shortened from 29 days in FY 1981 to 15 days in FY 1983.

2. While to a certain extent leaks occur randomly, significant patterns of leak activity were detected involving information of topical interest and other variables. For example:

-More than 40% of all intelligence leaks concerned the Soviet Union.

S E C R E T